We present new indicators of U.S. technological change for the period 1909-49 based on information contained in the catalogue of the Library of Congress. We use these indictors to estimate the connections between technological change and economic activity, and to investigate the relationship between fluctuations in innovative activity and the Great Depression. Although we do find statistically significant links between technological change, output and productivity, our results suggest that the slowdown in technological progress in the early 1930s does not appear to have contributed significantly to the Great Depression. On the other hand, the remarkable acceleration in innovations after 1934 did play a role in the recovery. *The authors would like to acknowledge helpful comments from
In spite of the key role played by technical change in models of economic growth and cyclical fluctuations, economists have, on the whole, failed to come up with compelling ways to measure it. The usual suspects -patents, expenditures on and/or numbers engaged in research and development, and enumeration of innovations -are all, for various reasons, flawed, especially for the years prior to WW II. 1 Similar to a Pirandello play, we have the characters but lack a good way to identify the author.
In this paper, we present new indicators of technological change for the period 1909-49 that, we argue, help to resolve the measurement problem. Our new measures are created using previously unexploited information from the Library of Congress (LOC) catalogue on the number of new technology titles (manuals, handbooks, and the like) published in the United
States during this period. To illustrate the value of these indicators, we employ them to evaluate a number of hypotheses in the literature that deal with the relationship between technical change and economic activity in the 1930s.
Before we describe our indicators and outline our approach, we review briefly the shortcomings associated with previous attempts to quantify technological change. It is generally agreed that patent statistics provide an imprecise measure of innovative activity. Patent applications, the usual metric, offer no guarantee that a commercially viable innovation will be forthcoming 2 and, even if it were to occur, knowledge of the filing date provides no information on the release date of the product or process. Furthermore, according to Schmookler (1961) , patent statistics for the 1930s are especially unreliable because the propensity to patent by 1 See, among others, Cyert and Mowery (1987) . corporations was adversely affected by the increase in political and judicial antipathy towards corporate patents. 3 The other widely accepted measure of innovation is R&D expenditures and/or numbers employed in private, non-farm research facilities. The problem with these data, at least for the period prior to WW II, is that figures on R&D employment are limited to a few benchmark dates while those on R&D expenditures pertain to one sector of the economy (manufacturing).
Although useful as broad indicators of trends in innovative effort, 4 the numbers available for this period have little value for detailed statistical analysis. Moreover, R&D data, like patent applications, record inputs into the inventive process not the output of commercially viable innovations. It is the latter not the former that matters to those interested in the impact of technical change on economic activity.
The enumeration of important innovations -the method used by Mensch (1979) and others to calculate innovative activity -remains the best direct measure of technical change but it too has drawbacks. In particular, both the significance of the product/process and the timing of its introduction are highly subjective. The predicament is clear: if we want to evaluate quantitatively the link between technical change and economic activity in the pre-WW II period, we need a measure that provides consistent, complete, objective, and direct estimates of commercially viable innovations.
Our new indicators of technological change, we believe, satisfy these requirements. They are based on data drawn from the Library of Congress on the number of new technology titles in various fields published in the United States during the first fifty years of the last century. 5 Since the Library of Congress is the largest in the United States and acts as the country's copyright depository, these data provide an accurate representation of the flow of new 3 Although Griliches (1993) is skeptical of this explanation, the fact remains that patent applications are out of step with other evidence of an increase in innovative activity in the 1930s. 4 See, for example, Mowery and Rosenberg (2000) , and Kleinknecht (1987, p. 111 ). 5 Alexopoulos (2006) technology books available to the trade and to the public. 6 Moreover, publication statistics on new technology books in the early part of the twentieth century are likely to offer first rate indicators of technological change for the simple reason that there were few alternatives to books as a way to "spread the news". 7 Our new measure is superior in a number of respects to the traditional indicators of technical change. First, it is amenable to statistical analysis because the LOC data can be used to create a consistent time series on an annual basis for the entire period 1909-49, both for technology in general and for various sub-groups of technologies that would have been used in the private, non-farm economy. Second, unlike patents and R&D statistics, publications of new technology books are timed to coincide with the commercialization of new products or processes. That is, the books appear at the precise moment that the innovations are most likely to exert their influence on output and productivity. Third, these indicators suffer from none of the arbitrariness associated with enumeration exercises -timing and numbers are strictly determined by their first appearance in the MARC records of the LOC.
To summarize briefly our results, we find first that our indicators are, for the most part, consistent with the case studies reported by Mensch (1981) , Fields (2003) , and others.
Second, using vector autoregressions (VARs) -a standard statistical technique for such analyses 8 -we are able to identify a strong causal connection between technological advances as measured by new publications and changes in TFP and GNP per capita for the years 1909-49.
We find, moreover, that while the impact of technical change on economic activity was substantial, our results also indicate that some innovations mattered more than others. Thus, advances in electrical and mechanical machinery, manufacturing, and automobiles had a powerful, positive influence on both GNP per capita and measured TFP, new chemical 6 According to the Copyright Act of 1870, all copyright applicants were required to send two copies of their work to the LOC. 7 It is probably safe to say that new books on technology provide an even more complete picture of technological change during our period than they do for the years covered by Alexopoulos (2006) . This is encouraging because
Alexopoulos was able to show that these data offer an excellent measure of advances in commercially viable innovations. 8 Moreover, he notes that certain sectors -telecommunications, electric utilities, structural engineering, wholesale and retail trades, and so on -were much more innovative than others.
There are two difficulties with this approach. His TFP numbers, drawn from Kendrick (1961) and Solow (1957) Although compelling, especially to those who embrace the real business cycle paradigm, the question remains, what do these broadly defined productivity shocks actually represent? That is, since these shocks are identified using either the Solow residual or the Gali (1999) long run identification method, and since factors other than technology may be contained in these measures, we still need a way to distinguish between changes in pure technology and changes in other factors. 9 In an effort to address precisely this problem, Ohanian (2003) attempts to estimate how much of the decline in Kendrick's measured TFP in the early 1930s can be attributed to various components of the residual including changes in: capacity utilization, the quality of factor inputs, the composition of production, labor-hoarding, and economies of scale. He finds that these factors explain less than one third of the eighteen percent decrease, leaving unexplained the remaining two thirds. 10 Although he observes that the decrease in TFP is unlikely to be attributable to "technological regress" (and we agree), this does not rule out the possibility that the decline may be linked to negative pure technology shocks which caused the rate of innovative activity to drop below its trend level. 11 With our new indicators, however, we can evaluate with some precision the role played by pure technology shocks in the downturn. We find that while broadly defined productivity shocks reduced the efficiency with which inputs were transformed into outputs and thus fostered the depression, narrowly construed, pure technology shocks -as captured by our measure -did not.
Third, Mensch (1979), Kleinknecht (1987) , and others maintain, following Schumpeter, that recovery from the depression was directly linked to the burst of innovative activity that occurred in the second half of the 1930s. 12 The problem, once again, is that the evidence, while suggestive, fails to establish a causal connection between innovations, output, and productivity.
Our new measures solve the problem. Briefly, we find that the acceleration of technical change after 1934 did play a significant role in the recovery to the end of the decade. More generally, on the assumption that technological progress remained at rates achieved in the 1920s, our calculations suggest that it would have taken an additional 14 years for GNP per capita to have matched the actual level reached in 1939 because of slower growth in TFP. Technological change does not offer a complete explanation for the recovery -other forces were clearly at work -but it does seem to have made a significant contribution to it. 9 See e.g., Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006) for a discussion of this point. 10 Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) perform a similar cleansing of the Solow residuals for the post WWII period.
11 R. Szostak (1995) argues that the slowdown in innovative activity in the late 1920s was a major contributor to the great depression but lack evidence to support his contention. 12 Weintraub's (1939) In Figure 1 , we report the results of our efforts. 17 However, in our case, the weight given to each technology annually is determined by the number of new titles released on it each year. This means that our indicators are high for one of two reasons: (1) lots of small innovations are brought to market during the course of the year, each accompanied by a couple of new publications, or (2) a major innovation debuts that affects many sectors and fosters numerous new titles. In both cases, we would expect to observe a positive correlation between the number of new publications and output and productivity. And, this, of course, is exactly the relationship that we are trying to capture.
There are, finally, innovative changes in management, factory organization, and power sources that traditional measures of technical change may overlook. They are often not amenable to the patent process, they may have little to do with the research lab, and they are unlikely to be embodied in some major new piece of equipment. They can, however, show up in publications for the simple reason that someone stands to profit from writing about them. 18 Moreover, their impact is frequently considerable. Thus, as Weintraub (1939, p. 24) points out, in a number of manufacturing industries -cotton-garment production and automobiles, for example -changes in factory layout and, more generally, in the organization of production, resulted in substantial increases in productivity through improvements in the flow of work and savings in supervisory labor, equipment, floor space, and inventories in the 1930s with little, if any, changes in equipment.
Books, of course, are not the only way to disseminate information about new technologies. Even in the pre-WW II period, trade journals, professional and/or scientific conferences, and direct marketing, among others, served as sources of information on new technologies. In the final analysis, of course, the proof of the pudding is in the eating but it is reasonable to believe that these other methods of communications acted as complements to our book based measures of technical change. In any case, to the extent that our indicators omit some innovations, the bias runs against (and not in favor of) our finding a relationship between publications and increases in economic activity and should, therefore, be viewed as establishing a lower bound on the true impact of technological change over this time period.
II.C. Old and New Indicators Compared
While perhaps intuitively appealing, we must still demonstrate that our new measures provide an accurate, quantitative account of innovative activity. In a previous article, innovations are often less cut-and-dried than he would like us to believe (see Jewkes, et al (1969) for the details), they do offer widely accepted benchmarks with which we can evaluate our indicators. 19 In Table 1 , we compare the innovation dates reported by Mensch (1979) and the commercialization dates from Jewkes, et al (1969) , with the dates that the same innovations made their first appearance in the LOC database. 20 There is, on the whole, a reasonable coincidence of timing between the series. Although we are reluctant to draw too much comfort from these results, they do suggest that publications are in general agreement with a standard measure of innovations during this time period.
In Figure 2 , we compare our publication series with the estimates of scientists employed in R&D laboratories, spending on R&D in industry and Mensch's (1979) series on important innovations. Although the R&D figures measure inputs into the inventive process not the output 19 Although the dating of major innovations can help to single out periods of intense innovative activity, as we mentioned before, both timing and significance are highly subjective. A good example of this is the radio. An apparently straightforward innovation, the radio was, in fact, the outcome of a series of independent innovations, each one of which gave rise to something that resembled the modern radio. It was, without question, a major innovation but it is unclear which of the many steps should be used for dating purposes. 20 In light of the inherent subjectivity of Mensch's (1979) exercise, in a few instances we modified his dating on the basis of a reconsideration of the case studies in Jewkes et al (1969) and with corroboration from other sources.
Moreover, when the commercialization dates were not available from Jewkes, et al (1969) our dates are based on information from http://inventors.about.com of commercially viable innovations 21 and Mensch's (1979) series is subjective, the results reveal a rough correspondence in trend between the measures. On the basis of these, it seems safe to conclude that new technology titles drawn from the MARC records of the LOC do offer reliable indicators of innovative activity in the U.S. in the first half of the twentieth century. 22 And, of course, they have advantages that the other measures lack. The next step is to determine the extent to which productivity improvements and growth in per capita GNP during this period were driven by innovative activity during this period. comes from Kendrick (1961) . 23 Following Solow (1957), we obtain our labor input measure from the Economic Almanac and our estimate of the capital stock from Goldsmith (1956) .
Finally, in order to compute our TFP series, we employ Solow's (1957) figure for the share of 21 Although R&D outlays may be a good measure of the intensity of inventive activity, it is important to note, as
Mowery and Rosenberg (2000) and others do, that many innovations are not lab based and much lab research does not result in commercially viable innovations. 22 Since none of these measures match the pattern traced by patent applications reported by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, especially in the 1930s, we would argue, following Schmookler (1961) and Griliches (1993) , that the problem lies with the latter not the former. 23 The 1930s at which time a sea change occurred in the type and scope of price data collected. 25 In brief, then, because of the changes that occurred between the beginning and the end of the decade in the availability and measurement of prices and in the weights assigned to goods and services in the different price indexes, inferences based solely on real series created using 1929 price deflators are likely to be misleading. The results reported in the next section confirm our misgivings.
III.B. GNP and technology
We begin by examining the links between technological change (as measured by our indicators) and non-farm private sector GNP per capita. 26 Specifically, we estimate the following bi-variate VAR:
In equation (1), α is a constant, ε t is a vector of time t residuals,
where GNP t is real GNP in year t measured in one of 1929, 1939 or 1947 dollars, POP t is the 24 Goldsmith's (1956) capital stock estimates are only available in 1929 dollars. Since the base year matters, when we calculate our TFP series, we convert these numbers to 1939 and 1947 prices using the GNP deflators.
25 Kendrick (1961) , who uses numbers expressed in constant 1929 dollars, acknowledges the possibility that the choice of the base year could affect his productivity estimates but he does not experiment with alternatives in his famous book. 26 We focus on the private, non-farm sector since this has been the standard in the literature. (See, for example, Field technologies have a strong and significant impact on output; in fact, the last three are often significant at the five percent level. In addition, the Granger causality tests in Table 3 show that technology tends to Granger cause GNP per capita -not the other way round -with the exception, once again, of chemicals.
It is important to note that the standard errors associated with the point estimates confirm our expectation that the statistical significance of our results is sensitive to the choice of base year. That is, technical change has a much greater impact on GNP when the latter is measured in Researchers initially failed to find much evidence in the output and productivity statistics of the impact of computers -leading to Solow's famous quip that computers are everywhere except in the data. With the introduction of new price indexes, however, the full force of the IT revolution finally appeared in the numbers.
The variance decompositions reported in Table 4 provide further information on the role technological change played in determining the variance of GNP per capita. Although the results are sensitive to choice of base year, the variance decomposition exercise suggests that about 14 percent of the short-run variation is attributable to electronics and electrical technology, [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] percent to automobiles, and between 2 and 12 percent to manufacturing technologies.
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Moreover, these effects increase significantly over the medium to long term, an indication that the shocks in all likelihood had long-lasting consequences for output.
Our results raise an obvious question -are they a case of correlation without causation?
That is, does the increase in new technology titles merely represent a serendipitous upswing in all publications in tandem with increases in GNP per capita or do they instead capture a causal link between technological change and output growth? To answer this question, we ran the same regressions using the number of new children's books in place of the number of new technology books. The coefficient on this series in the GNP per capita equation is reported at the bottom of Table 2 . On the basis of the standard errors and the Granger-causality tests we reject the hypothesis that new children's books predict GNP per capita. This result is further confirmed by the impulse responses shown in Figure 5 . Shocks to children's books fail to have a significant impact on output. Overall, then, it is safe to conclude that while new technology titles do seem to affect economic activity, children's book do not. Although not foolproof, the finding is, at the very least, reassuring.
III.C. TFP and technological change
Our next task is to examine the impact of technical change on TFP. 31 Before we do this, it is necessary to say a few words about the TFP statistics. There are two widely employed ways to compute TFP for the early part of the twentieth century, that of Kendrick (1961) , based on a linear production function with the weights on inputs determined by their prices in a given base year, and that of Solow (1957), based on the more general function Q=F(K,L) where the weights assigned to inputs are based on factor shares. 32 We use the latter in this paper for two reasons.
First as Domar (1962) , among others, have pointed out, over long horizons the Solow (1957) method is likely to prove the more reliable of the two. Second, the Tornqvist/Solow approach is now the method of choice for those interested in measuring changes in productivity over time and across sectors. 31 We also ran regressions using output per man-hour as the relevant productivity measure. While there are some differences in magnitudes, the results are broadly similar to those for TFP and therefore are not reported here. They are, of course, available upon request.
We also present two sets of findings for TFP. The first set is based on TFP unadjusted for capital utilization, the second adjusted using Solow's (1957) 
where Y t = [ln(TFP t ), ln(X t )] ′. We again assume that technology shocks only affect TFP with a one year lag. The estimated coefficients for the TFP regressions are reported in Table 5 with the Granger-causality tests and the variance decompositions for the regressions reported in Tables 6   and 7 respectively.
We begin with the point estimates reported in Tables 5. They indicate, much as they did for private non-farm GNP per capita, that increases in technological change raise productivity.
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The impact, again, varies across technologies and is sensitive to the choice of the deflator.
Correction for capital utilization, on the other hand, has virtually no impact on our basic results.
In Table 6 , we report the Granger causality tests for the TFP measures. As can be seen, while TFP computed using data measured in either 1939 or 1947 dollars varies significantly at the five and ten percent levels with technical change across all subgroups save telecommunications, when TFP is calculated using data deflated with the 1929 price series, changes in automobile technologies appear to be the only ones that have a significant impact on productivity. 34 The it is necessary to take a broad analytical perspective. Although case studies do help us identify innovations and, perhaps, their potential contribution to output and productivity, they cannot on their own offer a measure of their overall impact because they are generally unable to incorporate these effects beyond the confines of a single firm or sector. For example, although Mensch's (1979) list of major innovations in telecommunications and chemicals in the 1930s is long, suggesting that they played a major role in productivity gains during the period, our results indicate, instead, that their impact was relatively modest. In short, the ability to identify economy wide effects depends crucially on having a quantifiable measure of technical changethus the value of our new indicators. 36 In support of the attrition argument see Bresnahan and Raff (1991) and Goldin (2000) for evidence on selective retention of workers. Field (2003, p. 1409-10) rejects both of these arguments.
37 Field (2006) shows that wholesale and retail trades, transportation, public utilities, and manufacturing accounted for roughly 95 percent of productivity gains in the 1930s. He provides some anecdotal evidence that these gains were driven by technological change. Our data at this point are not fine grained enough to allow us to evaluate the specifics of this argument.
IV.2. Technology or Not Technology…That is the question
Since the two remaining questions deal with the impact of fluctuations in innovative activity on the downturn and recovery during the 1930s -essentially two sides of the same coin -we use a single framework to respond to both. In terms of the literature, Francis lower.
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Panel B of Figure 10 shows what paths these variables would have taken if only the 'nontechnology' shocks (depicted in the first two Panels in Figure 9 ) had hit the economy and technical change had remained at either the average rate of the 1920s or the 1929 rate. . 42 The obvious conclusion is that the type of technology 39 The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimates. 40 If we were to use the numbers presented in Field (2003) shocks identified by our indicators was at most a minor contributor to downturn in the early 1930s. These results, of course, do not exclude the possibility that more broadly defined technology shocks played a significant role in the downturn but they do indicate that pure technology shocks (as measured by our indicators) were relatively unimportant. 43 illustrates, once the impact of the technology shocks depicted in Figure 9 are added to equations (8) and (10) In summary, we find that while the technological change identified by our indicators does help explain the recovery path of the US economy from the Great Depression, it provides a much less compelling account of the initial drop in economic activity at the beginning of the 1930s.
Although it would be unwise to claim too much for this observation given the inherent problems associated with counterfactuals and the fact that our indicators only pick up a portion of what could broadly be defined as technological change, our results are, nevertheless, suggestive.
Since the slowdown in innovative activity as measured by our indicators began, for the most part, after 1930, it would appear unlikely that the onset of the Great Depression can be ascribed to the type of negative technology shocks identified by our indicators.
V. Conclusions
We present in this paper a novel and we believe compelling way to measure technological change based on annual fluctuations in the number of new technology titles (both aggregate and by sub-groups) in the Library of Congress. We argue that our indicators dominate the standard measures of technical change such as patent applications, research and development expenditures, and direct enumeration of major innovations during the years 1909-49 for a number of reasons. They provide a consistent series available on an annual basis, they are based on strictly objective criteria -appearance in the data base of the LOC -and, perhaps most important, new technology publications are likely to track closely the timing of the commercialization of innovations. We use bi-variate VAR regressions to show that causal links did, in fact, exist for our period between innovative activity as captured by our indicators (an important caveat) and GNP per capita and TFP -although, as we point out, some technologies mattered more than others. In particular, manufacturing, automobile, and machine technologies had a much greater impact on output and productivity than those in chemicals and telecommunications. 
